| Author(s) | Friedrich Engels |
|---|---|
| Written | 23 March 1854 |
ENGELS TO MARX
IN LONDON
Manchester, 23 March 1854
Dear Marx,
I return Lassalle's letter herewith. At the time I forgot to enclose the first one, which is still here.[1] You'll have received the two half notes yesterday and the day before. T/B 58 166, Newcastle on Tyne, 17 August 1852, £5.
Lassalle's strategical operations are very diplomatic. His answer to the Enos and Rodosto affair is the foolish platitude, itself merely intended as dust in the eyes, that Constantinople must be protected[2] ; if the 2 fleets and the Army of the Danube cannot protect it, then neither can 100,000 French and English. From his own standpoint, what he ought to have said was: if they are to be launched against Sevastopol or Odessa, they are, at any rate, closer to hand at Rodosto than in Malta or Toulon.
The notion that a move into Serbia would place the Austrians 'in the rear of the Turkish Army of the Danube' is basically wrong. The Austrians must make their crossing at Belgrade or not very far below it, or else enter Wallachia via Mehadia along the left bank of the Danube. In the first case they would find themselves in the extension of the Turkish left wing, in the second, to the front of it. That this would mean the immediate sacrifice of Kalafat and Vidin, with the exception of the garrison, is evident—but not that this Turkish left wing would be lost and its remnants compelled to fall back on the Shumla line. Au contraire,[3]
1. the correct tactics for the Austrians would be to march immediately on Sofia via Nissa, hence the correct tactics for the Turks would be to withdraw from Vidin, likewise to Sofia. Not having so far to go, they would be there before the Austrians and could either make a stand in the Balkans or withdraw towards Adrianople.[4]
2. Should the Austrians be stupid enough to march on Vidin, the Turks would still make for Sofia. This division of Omer Pasha's principal corps would not involve the fragmentation of his forces, since the new enemy would necessitate a new Adrianople-Sofia-Belgrade-Vidin operational line; thus the Turkish left wing would become an independent army.
3. But should Lassalle's peculiar strategy COME TO PASS, no amount of falling back on the Shumla line would avail, for the latter, having already been outflanked as a result of the sacrifice of the highway from Belgrade to Constantinople, would, on the contrary, have to be abandoned all the more precipitately in order to assemble all available reserves at Adrianople and advance against the first enemy to pass through the Balkans.
One can see, incidentally, that these lucubrations all emanate from that 'diplomatic source' which seems to enjoy showing off on the subject of strategic developments.
Tomorrow I shall be sending The Daily News a description of Kronstadt[5] ; faulty though much of its fortifications may be, I'm afraid half a dozen screw ships of the line will nevertheless go to blazes before it knuckles under.
The HIGHWAYMEN have been kind enough to return Lupus his POCKET-BOOK minus 7 Prussian taler notes.[6] His philistines mean to do something towards making good the loss of his money and his watch, and he might even get some smart-money into the bargain. Borchardt is attending to his bruises, and so the thing is resolving itself.
'But as for the fright, the fright he got, There's no compensation for that.'[7]
Which is why he is somewhat caduc[8] and snappish, apparently in the belief that Heise and I were responsible for his foolishness, the drubbing he got and all.
Who is this chap who is getting Heinzen to pass him off as an editor of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung? See last batch of Reform, No. 50 or thereabouts.
Your
F. E.