| Author(s) | Friedrich Engels |
|---|---|
| Written | 11 September 1857 |
90
ENGELS TO MARX[1]
IN LONDON
[Ryde, 11 or 12 September 1857]
[...] Berthier was a mere CLERK without an idea in his head, but frightfully zealous in the service and punctilious; when Napoleon sent him to Bavaria in 1809 to organise the troops before his own arrival, his ordres et contreordres[2] split the army into three. Half of it was with Davout at Regensburg, the remainder with Masséna at Augsburg, and the Bavarians in between at Abensberg, so that a rapid advance by Archduke Charles would have enabled him to defeat the various corps one by one. It was only Napoleon's arrival and the slowness of the Austrians that saved the French.
In 1813 Bernadotte was not a general at all but a diplomat. He prevented the generals under him from attacking and when, in contravention of this order, Bülow won his two victories at Grossbeeren and Dennewitz,[3] Bernadotte stopped the pursuit. He was in constant touch with the French. When Blücher marched to the Elbe to join up with him and to force him at last to act, he continued to prevaricate until Sir Ch. Stewart (the English commissary in his camp) told him that if he didn't march immediately, he wouldn't pay out another penny. This helped—nevertheless it was purely honoris causa that the Swedes appeared in the firing-line at Leipzig,[4] and during the whole campaign they lost less than 200 men in battle.— In 1798 Bernadotte was French ambassador in Vienna; to celebrate the anniversary of a victory over the Austrians he hoisted the tricolor, whereupon the populace stormed his residence and burned the flag. He left, but Napoleon decided against him and persuaded the Directory TO LET THE MATTER DROP. [...] [...] Jomini, Vie politique et militaire de Napoléon, t. II, p. 60 qq. (Napoleon says)[5]
'Bernadotte... un homme fin, d'un extérieur brillant; les plans d'opération qu'il avait faits comme ministre de la guerre, prouvaient qu'il était meilleur lieutenant, que général en chef'[6] [p. 60].
Marmont, jadis mon aide de camp et officier d'artillerie' [pp. 60-61]. Davout, qui avait reçu une bonne éducation, avait la tête fortement organisée et des idées de guerre très justes. Ses manières rudes et un caractère à la fois soupçonneux et dur lui ont fait beaucoup d'ennemis, et dans les graves circonstances où il s'est trouvé, l'esprit de parti s'est déchaîné contre lui avec une grande injustice. Sévère, mais juste envers ses subordonnés, mieux qu'aucun autre il sut maintenir la discipline parmi ses soldats; aucun de mes maréchaux n'exigeait plus de ses subordonnés, et aucun ne les fit servir avec tant d'exactitude' [p. 61'].
'Soult, d'un physique mâle, d'un esprit étendu, laborieux, actif, infatigable, avait fait preuve de talents supérieurs' [p. 61].
'Lannes; couvert de gloire et de blessures, ce brave manquait de principes faits sur la guerre; mais il y suppléait par un jugement admirable et sur le champ de bataille il ne le cédait à aucun de ses collègues' [p. 61].
'Ney. Lannes fut peut être aussi brillant que lui dans maintes attaques; mais la force d'âme que Ney déploya dans le grand désastre de 1812 où il commanda successivement tous les corps de l'armée, lui assigne le premier rang parmi les braves de tous les jours. De même que plusieurs de ses collègues il n'entendait point la guerre en grand sur la cartel; mais sur le terrain, rien n'égalait son assurance, son coup d'oeil et son aplomb' [p. 62].
'Murât, qui avait dû à sa bonne mine, à son courage et à son activité l'honneur d'être mon aide de camp et mon beau-frère, n'a jamais été à la hauteur de la réputation colossale que je lui avais faite. Du reste, il avait de l'esprit naturel, un courage brillant et une grande activité' [p. 63],
'Masséna reçut de la nature tout ce qui fait un excellent homme de guerre, doué d'un grand caractère, d'un courage éprouvé et d'un coup d'oeil qui inspirait les résolutions les plus promptes et les plus heureuses, on ne peut lui refuser une place distinguée parmi les capitaines modernes. Cependant il faut avouer qu'il brillait plus dans les combats que dans le conseil' [p. 63].
'Brune ne manquait pas de certain mérite, c'était pourtant pour tout prendre un général de tribune bien plus qu'un militaire redoutable'[7] [p. 64],
'Mortier, moins brillant, était pourtant plus solide, son calme et son sang-froid, passés en proverbe parmi les soldats, lui avaient valu plus d'un succès et il était du nombre de ceux qui pouvaient conduire un corps sous ma direction' [p. 64].
'Bessières avait fait ses preuves près de moi à l'armée d'Italie où il commandait mes guides à cheval. Il n'avait pour lui qu'un grand esprit d'ordre et une valeur reconnue. Il était méthodique et d'une timidité exessive dans le conseil' [p. 64].
'Lefebvre, duc de Dantzic, était un vrai grenadier. Enfant de la nature, il ne devait rien qu'à son esprit naturel, à une grande bravoure, et à un caractère simple et naif. Il savait se faire aimer du soldat et le mener droit à une position; c'était tout son mérite' [p. 64].
'Jourdan avait dû à la fortune une grande partie de sa réputation. Bon administrateur, laborieux, homme d'ordre et intègre. Et ayant de l'instruction, il eût été fort bon chef d'état major d'une grande armée sous un chef qui l'eut bien dirigé' [p. 64].
'Macdonald... avait fort mal manoeuvré à la Trebbia' [...]» [p. 65].
Berthier is not mentioned in this collection. Apropos: what about your material on Bern? Of him it must be said that he excelled in command of smaller corps of 5-10,000 men and could inspire younger troops with self-assurance by good use of natural cover and [artillery] support; that he particularly distinguished himself in the small [mountain] warfare into which the whole of the first Transylvanian campaign[8] developed, but that he had A CONSIDERABLE DASH OF THE PARTISAN, which made him incapable of commanding bigger armies. In the second Transylva- nian campaign, when masses of Russians invaded, he operated again with rash raids after the manner of partisans without any consideration for the relative strength of the opposing forces and thus lost not only Transylvania but the whole of his army too. His march into the Banat (before the second Transylvanian cam- paign) achieved nothing[9] ; he seems to have been unable to cope with the greater masses he was in command of. Praise is due to his great fortitude and his art of arousing the men's confidence in his otherwise unmartial-looking person. He could quickly achieve superficial organisation and discipline, but was satisfied at that. He neglected to build up a body of picked troops, for which the first Transylvanian campaign provided time enough and which was the greatest necessity, and hence all the outward organisation—and relative discipline—disappeared at the first setback. His bigger campaign plans all bear a heavy empreinte[10] of partisan warfare; the basic features are mostly correct but presuppose far different means from those available, and even supposing that they were available they could be put to better use. E.g. his plan to abandon Hungary and break through to Italy via Trieste. Had the means for this been at his disposal and capable of being concentrated, the forces would thus have been provided with which to defeat Haynau, whereupon the Russians, instead of concentrating, would have been obliged to split up in order to hold what they had captured, and hence could have been defeated piecemeal. It must not be forgotten, however, that in an insurrectionary war these partisan methods are partially justified precisely because of the uncertainty concerning the means really available; the bigger the scale of the war, however, the less appropriate they become.[11]
[...] Can you find out what Bockbrücken (ponts à chevalets[12] ) are in English? I should also like to have a description of the Austrian Birago pontoons and a brief excerpt—merely an outline—on the design of pontoons in the various armies (SEE Sir Howard Douglas, Military Bridges), also whether the Russians and Prussians still have canvas pontoons. I have no material here, and such as I have in Manchester is very old. I have something on English pontoons [...].