Letter to Karl Marx, April 10, 1866

Author(s) Friedrich Engels
Written 10 April 1866


First published in Der Briefwechsel zwischen F. Engels und K. Marx, Bd. 3, Stuttgart, 1913
Printed according to the original
Published in English for the first time in Marx-Engels Collected Works, Volume 42


ENGELS TO MARX

IN MARGATE

Manchester, 10 April 1866

Dear Moor,

To all appearances, the Russians want war, their purpose seeming to be restoration of Poland under Russian rule and possibly annexation of Moldavia. The Kölnische Zeitung, which is, of course, in mortal fear of war, has sent J. von Wickede, its military man, to Bohemia, to inspect what is claimed to be Austria's state of armament. The fellow arrives—on 3 April, that is 14 days after Bismarck's note[1] —and everywhere finds things on a profoundly pacific footing, except that some Bohemian regiments have been transferred to their western districts, so that they can put themselves on a war footing more quickly. No soldiers recalled from leave, no fortress armed. Nothing.[2] The whole disgraceful affair thus deliberately provoked by Bismarck.

Furthermore: the Russians are concentrating troops on the Austrian and on the Prussian frontier with Poland, and the soldiers are saying quite openly that those who are positioned on the Prussian frontier will shortly occupy Posen as soon as the Prussian troops take the field against the Austrians. Apart from the fact that the Russians would thereby secure the rest of Prussian Poland for themselves immediately, their mission will also be to suppress any revolutionary movements in Berlin. However, that would in all probability be a miscalculation and, at any rate, disqualify the Hohenzollerns for the future.

Finally, today's LEADER in The Times which comes down stupidly, mendaciously, woodenly but decisively on Prussia's side and represents Austria as the attacking party. That was written to order.[3]

In view of all this, war seems to me certain; the situation within Germany also makes it inevitable, following the new Austrian note appealing to the Confederation, as well as Monsieur Bismarck's proposal regarding a German parliament[4] —what a dunderhead the fellow must be to believe that that would assist him even in the very slightest! The Austrian note seems to be based on the assumption that the storm will break after all. Otherwise they would at least have left the back-door open to facilitate the Prussians' retreat through Bismarck's resignation. But the moment that they appeal to the Confederation, that's an end to it; another ministry in Prussia would not submit to a Confederation majority either.

Bonaparte will probably keep quiet, at least for the time being; Bismarck has already offered him Saarbrücken, etc., and, if need be, he would also make him a present of the Bavarian Palatinate. If he sees the Russians committed on the Prussian side, he won't risk anything rash.

If the storm really does break, for the first time in history the course of events will depend on the attitude taken by Berlin. If the Berliners hit out at the right time, things may turn out well—but who can rely on them?

As regards the congress of the International, I don't properly see how you can hope to avoid it.[5] Nor do I see how a further postponement would improve things much. Après tout,[6] any demonstration of that kind would in a certain sense—at least as far as we ourselves are concerned—always be a fiasco. But in full view of Europe? I believe that could still be avoided even now. After all, the Germans with their polyglot capacities would have the whole thing under their control, and it is precisely the Germans who are on our side. Whether the congress decides anything useful is a secondary matter, as long as all scandal can be avoided; and that surely will now be the case. General resolutions of a theoretical kind or referring to international support for strikes, etc., can surely be passed without any danger. Neverthe- less, you must know that better than I, I cannot really judge of it from here. Meanwhile, I would definitely not go to Paris about it. You have no one to protect you, and the police will have no qualms about striking—emissary from a public workers' association with distinctly revolutionary tendencies, which can easily be used to conceal other clandestine matters—cela suffit.[7] The whole business is just not worth the risk.

You would do much better to stay in Margate until the last scar is no longer in the slightest degree susceptible, and do plenty of walking in the fresh air. Who knows how soon you will once more have need of a stout constitution. The atmosphere is highly electric, and we shall perhaps soon be in the midst of the storm again; that will no doubt also help resolve the difficulty with the congress.

I shall be letting you have a bit of money as soon as I can. I shall also try and see Gumpert and ask him about terminating the sea-cure and what you should do afterwards about the arsenic.

Your

F. E.

  1. ↑ In the spring of 1866 the conflict between Prussia and Austria sharpened over their joint possession of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. The Bismarck government regarded Austria as its main rival in the struggle for hegemony in Germany and sought for a casus belli. With this aim in view it accused Austria, which ruled Holstein, of encouraging the anti-Prussian movement there. Austria rejected Prussia's accusations and on 16 March 1866 sent a circular dispatch to several member states of the German Confederation (a union of German states founded by the Vienna Congress in 1815) asking for their mediation in the conflict or military assistance against Prussia. Prussia in its turn also sought the support of the German Confederation. In its circular dispatch of 24 March 1866 to the German states, the Prussian government proposed a reform of the political and military institutions of the German Confederation. Bismarck demagogically proposed that this reform be carried out through a German parliament elected on the basis of universal suffrage.
  2. ↑ Engels refers to the report 'Die Lage, Köln, 7. April', Kölnische Zeitung, 8 April 1866.
  3. ↑ The Times, No. 25468, 10 April 1866, leader.
  4. ↑ A reference to the circular dispatch of 16 March 1866 sent by the Austrian government (see Note 316).
    On 9 April 1866, the Prussian government submitted to the Federal Diet a proposal that an all-German parliament be convened through universal suffrage in order to decide the question of reforming the German Confedera tion.
  5. ↑ See this volume, pp. 258-59.
  6. ↑ After all
  7. ↑ that will suffice