| Author(s) | Friedrich Engels |
|---|---|
| Written | 22 October 1885 |
ENGELS TO SALO FAERBER
IN BRESLAU
London, 22 October 1885
Dear Sir,
I have received your esteemed note of the 15th,[1] though the seal was badly damaged; this I enclose herewith to the greater glory of Mr Stephan.[2]
Since 1848 I, too, have frequently maintained that Russian tsardom is the last refuge and chief military reserve of European reaction. However there have been many changes in Russia over the past 20 years. The so-called emancipation of the peasants has created a thoroughly revolutionary situation in that it has placed the peasants in a situation in which they can neither live nor die. The rapid development of large-scale industry and its means of communication, the banks, etc., have merely aggravated this situation. Russia is faced with its own 1789. The Nihilists,[3] on the one hand, and a financial crisis on the other are symptomatic of this situation. Prior to the last loan, things had got to such a pitch that the Russian government was unable to raise money even in Berlin unless the loan was guaranteed by a representative assembly. Even Mendelssohn imposed this condition. At this point, when tsardom was in dire straits, Bismarck stepped in and authorised a loan, admittedly of a paltry 15 million pounds, a drop in the ocean, but enough to provide a few years' respite. By doing so, Bismarck subjugated Russia, which even today cannot get money without him, but by the same token he also put off the Russian revolution and that certainly did not suit his book either. It is the first time Bismarck has done something that has not indirectly and contrary to his will turned out to our advantage and if he carries on in the same way we may no longer have any use for him.
So whether the Russians are to get any more money depends primarily on Bismarck and, if he consents, the financial philistines of Germany will be only too delighted to fall into the trap set for them. The fact that they will lose their money in the process concerns me not at all; on the contrary, it will serve them right, nor will the so-called German national capital suffer much in the process, since the portion we are interested in consists of ironworks, factories and other instruments of production, which can hardly be loaned to the Russians. The so-called money capital that is being lent is to a great extent bogus capital, lines of credit, and this is of little consequence. What would be of far greater consequence would be to make it difficult, if not impossible, for the Russians to obtain credit, but on this score your typical German punter has more faith in Bismarck than in us. At the moment it's quite impossible for me to spend time on an attempt to reduce the question of Russian state credits to the size it deserves; a work of that kind, however timely and worthwhile, would nevertheless call for a study of Russian conditions from Russian sources.
As regards the actual financial side, a table showing the Russian national debt for the past few years together with lists of stock market prices would suffice, but in the case of economic conditions within the country itself a great deal of study would be necessary if one was to form an accurate opinion. One of the main works is a survey carried out by the Russian War Ministry under the title Boenno-cmamucmimecKiü cöopnuKb IV. Poccin,[4] St Petersburg, 1871.
Also: A. CKpeOHLjKift, KpecmbRHCKoe dbiio eh u,apcmeoeauie MMnepamopa AjieKctmdpa II,[5] Bonn, 1862-68, 4 volumes, about 5,000 pages in all.
Also the cöopHHKH CTaTHCTH^ecKHXi. CBT>,zi,T>Hiä[6] of the individual gouvernements,[7] in particular Moscow and Tver, and ÜHCOHI>, Cpaeuu-menbHaR cmamucmuKa Pocciu u sanadm-eeponeücKuxb eocydapcmeb,[8] St Petersburg, 1880, several volumes.
The Russian budgets aren't worth the paper they are written on. Sheer lies and invention, more so even than those presented in Prussia prior to 1848.
As to an evaluation of the armies now reorganised along Prussian lines, this is a sheer impossibility. We do know, however, that Austria and, to an even greater extent, Russia, lack the large educated class which alone can supply an adequate number of officers suitable for employment in armies of this size, and that, according to the account of their own General Kuropatkin,[9] the Russians' conduct of operations in 1878 in Turkey was inferior to that of the Prussians in 1806.[10]
Liebknecht's letter returned herewith.[11]
I am, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
F. Engels