| Author(s) | Friedrich Engels |
|---|---|
| Written | 23 October 1886 |
ENGELS TO AUGUST BEBEL
[IN PLAUEN NEAR DRESDEN]
London, 23 and 25 October 1886, Saturday
Dear Bebel,
The Sozialdemokrat containing your statement[1] arrived just now, at 9.30 p. m., and I am hastening to write to you although my letter cannot go off until 5.30 on Monday, when I shall have it regis- tered. But on Monday, I may again have a whole lot of proofs[2] re- quiring my immediate attention.
Your statement is so worded that no exception whatever can be taken to it — assuming the necessity of such a step. As to this, I cannot rightly judge but, even in the absence of Freytag's opinion, it would seem to me justified. From the viewpoint both of the cause in general and of the newspaper in particular, it was, to my mind, most fortun- ate that the verdict enabled you to take this step in a seemly way. To have conferred an official character on the paper in the first place was, in my view, a great mistake, and so, indeed, it has proved to be in the Reichstag and elsewhere; but once it had been done, you could hardly go back on it without appearing to disown the paper and beat a retreat. The verdict gave you an opportunity of going back on it without producing that impression and you did right in making use of it. Nor, as Liebknecht saw it, was there any question of beating a re- treat, and the paper will now be able to express the views of the great bulk of the party far more freely and with far less regard for the gen- tlemen of the right wing.
The Neue Zeit has not yet arrived.[3] I too take the view that Bismarck has got far more involved with the Russians than he need have done on France's account, and for this the main reason — besides those adduced by you, and overshadowing them all — is his having been told by the Russians what he knows to be true, namely: 'Either we must have decisive and resounding victories on the road to Constantinople, or else — we shall have révolution.' Without making sac- rifices, neither Alexander III nor yet the Russian diplomats can exor- eise the Pan-Slav and chauvinist spirit they have conjured up, for oth- erwise Alexander III will be bumped off by the generals and then, whether they like it or not, they'll get a national assembly. And a Russian revolution is what Bismarck fears above all else. The col- lapse of Russian tsarism would entail that of the Prusso-Bismarckian economy. And hence everything possible must be done to postpone the crash, despite Austria, despite the indignation of the middle classes in Germany, and despite Bismarck's knowledge that, either way, he will eventually undermine his system — which, after all, de- pends on German hegemony in Europe — and that, on the day old William[4] dies, both Russia and France will rattle their sabres in quite different fashion.
The worst of it is that, given the rascality of those in power, no one can say how, in case of war, the belligerents will assort themselves, who will side with, and who against whom. That the eventual outcome will be revolution is plain, but at the cost of what sacrifices, of what general prostration — and after who knows how many changes.
In the meanwhile there'll be a respite until the spring, and during that time much can happen. In Russia the fun might begin without more ado, old William might kick the bucket and Germany change its policy, the Turks (having been deprived of Bosnia by Austria and of Egypt by Britain, they will, of course, now regard these their former allies merely as traitors) may again get out of the Russian fur- row, etc.
Your opinion of the German bourgeoisie cannot be worse than mine. But it remains to be seen whether historical circumstances won't compel them actively to intervene willy-nilly, just like their French counterparts. The latter's performance is wretched enough and that of our lot would be even worse, but all the same they'd be forced to take a hand in their own history again. At the time, I read Berger's pronouncement with some pleasure, but as you say it's ap- plicable only to Bismarck's lifetime. That it's their intention to drop their own 'liberal' slogans for good, I do not for a moment doubt.
It remains to be seen whether they can do so once they no longer have a Bismarck to rule for them and find themselves face to face with nothing but imbecile squireens and dim-witted bureaucrats — people of their own moral calibre. For come war or peace, Germany's he- gemony has, during the past few months, gone for a burton and she has again become the humble servant of Russia. And it was only the chauvinist satisfaction of being the arbiter of Europe that held the whole bag of tricks together. Fear of the proletariat will certainly help things along. And if these chaps gain admittance to the government, they will certainly start off by adopting the very attitude you de- scribe, but will soon be forced to change their tune. I would go still further and say that even were the spell to be broken by the Old Man's death and the same people to remain at the helm as now, they would either be forced to resign as a result of renewed clashes — not only with the Court — or have to act in accordance with bourgeois views. Not at once, of course, but very soon. Political stagnation such as now obtains in Germany — a genuine Second Empire — can only be a transitory and exceptional state of affairs; large-scale industry will not allow its laws to be dictated by the cowardice of industrialists. Economic development will give rise to repeated clashes, each more severe than the last, nor will it suffer itself to be governed for any length of time by semi-feudal Junkers with feudal procliv- ities.
Come to that, there is also the possibility that in the spring they will all gird up their loins for war and, armed to the teeth, con- front one another, each fearing to begin, until one of them puts for- ward a solution involving mutual compromise and the swallowing up of small states, whereupon they'll all grab their share. That Bis- marck is presently adumbrating such an expedient seems probable enough.
25 October
Your remarks about Liebknecht's speeches presumably relate mainly to what he told the correspondent of the New Yorker Volkszeit- ung (little Cuno); this shouldn't be taken too literally — since inter- viewers always distort things. I agree that his other remarks about the Kulturkampf are somewhat misguided, but as you know, Liebknecht is very dependent on atmosphere and tends to chan- ce his hand with his audiences (not always successfully), while he ne- ver has more than two colours — black and white — on his palette. Not that very much harm will have been done, since it will all have been long since forgotten in America.
Goodbye, then, and mind you keep fit and send us occasional news of yourself during your imprisonment.[5] I hardly imagine that you will have to stay there for the full term, and in 9 months' time every- thing may have changed.
Your
F.E.