Letter to August Bebel, February 17, 1890

Author(s) Friedrich Engels
Written 17 February 1890


First published in: Marx and Engels, Works, First Russian Edition, Vol. XXVIII, Moscow, 1940
Published in English in full for the first time in Marx-Engels Collected Works, Volume 48


ENGELS TO AUGUST BEBEL

IN PLAUEN NEAR DRESDEN

London, 17 February 1890

Dear Bebel,

Karl Kautsky says you are proposing to telegraph to me on the evening of the 20th such results as are known to you, and it occurred to me that I had better let you have some information about the night deliv- ery service here so that you might not err through ignorance and we not get the telegram until the following morning after all. Ede, Fischer and Kautsky all take the view that it would be best to telegraph me, as they will all be here on Thursday evening and, I hope, also Julius.[1]

Details below, as I am still awaiting the information. For the rest I cannot congratulate your people enough. Yourself, first of all, on the perspicacity with which, in your last-but-one Viennese letter, you smelt out William the Younger's edicts before they had been promulgated,[2] and the whole lot of you not only on the splendid situ- ation in which you have been placed by our opponents—never have things been so favourable on the eve of an election—but also on the new situation which is apparently about to arise in Germany.

From the start I have thought that, because of his thirst for action qua efficient new broom, and because of his imperiousness that was bound sooner or later to clash with Bismarck's, William the Younger[3] was better suited to the task of undermining the ostensibly stable system in Germany, destroying the philistines' faith in the government and stabil- ity and causing a general state of confusion and uncertainty, than was even the 'noble' Frederick[4] (of whom, by the way, I have here seen a photograph in which he has exactly the same shifty, hereditary, Hohenzollern expression as his half-uncle Willich, son of Prince August, Frederick William IFs brother). But I couldn't have expected that he would attend to this with such promptitude and brilliance as he has done. The man is worth more than his weight in gold to us; he need fear no attempts on his life, for shooting him would not only be a crime but a colossal blunder. If the worst comes to the worst, we ought to provide him with a bodyguard against anarchist assininities.

As I see it, the position is as follows: The Christian Social Conservatives have got the whip hand with young William and, since Bismarck can do nothing to prevent this, he is giving the laddie a free rein in the hope that he will get himself into a thorough fix, at which time he, Bismarck, will step into the breach as guardian angel and thereafter be safe from any relapse. Hence Bismarck hopes for the worst possible Reichstag, which would soon be ripe for dissolution, thus enabling him once again to invoke the philistines' fear of the threat posed by the labour movement.

But here there is one thing Bismarck has forgotten, namely that, from the moment the philistine becomes aware of the discord between old Bismarck and young William, the aforesaid philistine will become an unknown quantity so far as Bismarck is concerned. The philistine will still be afraid, more so even than now, if only because he won't know

whom to look to for support. For now their own fear will drive the cowardly herd, not together, but apart. Confidence will have been lost, never to return in the same form as before.

From now on all Bismarck's expedients will avail him less and less. He wants to avenge himself on the National Liberals for having thrown out his expulsion clause.[5] In so doing he will kick away his last, feeble prop. He wants to bring the Centre[6] over onto his side, and in so doing will dissolve the Centre. The Catholic Junkers ardently desire to ally themselves with the Prussian Junkers, but the day that alliance is sealed the Catholic peasants and workers (on the Rhine the bourgeoisie is predominantly Protestant) will cease to be of any use. This breakup of the Centre will benefit no one so much as ourselves; for Germany it is, on a small scale, what the agreement over nationalities was for Austria on a large one—the elimination of the last party structure not resting upon a purely economic basis, in other words, an important factor in the process of clarification, a setting free of labour elements hitherto ideo- logically enslaved.

The philistine can no longer put his faith in little Willie because he is doing things which the philistine necessarily regards as foolish pranks; he can no longer put his faith in Bismarck because he sees that it's all up with his (B's) omnipotence.

What will come of this confusion, seeing how craven our bourgeoisie is, we cannot possibly say. At all events the old order has been smashed for good and can no more be resuscitated than an extinct species. Things are livening up again, and that's all we require. At first you will be better off, but it's worth considering whether Puttkamer's prediction of a greater state of emergency[7] might not eventually be realised. That too would be a step forward—the last, the very last panacea—pretty fright- ful for you while it lasted, but beyond all doubt heralding our victory. Before then, however, a great deal of water will have flowed down the Rhine.

Since conditions for the elections are favourable to a degree we could never have hoped for, my only fear is that we shall obtain too many seats. Every other party in the Reichstag can have as many jackasses and allow them to perpetrate as many blunders as it can afford to pay for, and nobody gives a damn, whereas we, if we are not to be held cheap, must have nothing but heroes and men of genius. Well, the fact is that we are becoming a great party and must learn to take the consequences.

In Paris the Boulangists have scored yet another victory.[8] It's all to the good. Paris has been greatly spoiled by the sybaritism of the many

novices in this sphere and by a chauvinism (not only the general French variety, but the specifically Parisian) that is based on the city's great past; the workers are either Possibilists[9] or Boulangists or Radicals—and the more the provinces thrive, as they are doing by comparison with Paris, the better we shall progress. The provinces have spoiled many a move- ment set in train by Paris; Paris will never spoil a movement emanating from the provinces.

Well, as regards telegraphing, I shall write to the head office here to say that, this week, telegrams should be delivered to me at any hour of the night. But if your telegrams are to be of any use, they must arrive here before 1 o'clock in the morning. So if, on Thursday night, you tele- graph before 11.30, that will leave 2Vi hours for transmission, allowing for the time difference; but not any later, as it wouldn't be much use. So 11.30 p.m. on Thursday at the latest. Ede is going to arrange for telegrams to be sent to us direct from Berlin, Hamburg, and Elberfeld.

But if you have no results to telegraph before 11.30 on Thursday, then it would be better to wait until about midday or 1 o'clock on Friday, when you are bound to know something, and perhaps again on Friday night at about 10 or 11; the latter would be desirable whatever happens.

Further, only the names of towns where we have won or got into the second ballot. Where there are several constituencies in one town, I suggest the following: For Hamburg write Hbg, all 3 seats; for Hamburg one two, write Hbg I and II constituency. Again: All victories first, then all second ballots that we are in; e.g. thus,—victory Berlin four, five, six, Hamburg, Breslau one, Chemnitz, Leipzig Province, etc., second ballot Berlin three, Breslau two, Dresden one, Leipzig city, etc. If that's too long, then: Fifteen victories, seventeen second ballots, etc. And in the second telegram: So many victories all told and so, etc. second ballots.

This will save money and time. Cordial regards and 1,200,000 votes.

Your

F. E.

  1. ↑ Julius Motteier
  2. ↑ Engels means A. Bebel's report which Die Arbeiter-Zeitung (No. 6) of 7 February 1890, carried in its regular feature 'Ausland: Deutschland'. The report was marked: Berlin, 4 February. The two edicts, promulgated by Emperor William II on 4 February 1890, on the eve of an election to the German Reichstag, actually amounted to a government pre-election programme.
    In his first edict, the Emperor instructed the Reichskanzler to appeal to the governments of a number of European countries with the proposal to convene an international conference on a unified labour legislation. (Such onference was indeed held in Berlin in March 1890.) In his second edict, addressed to the Ministers of Public Works, Trade and Industry, William II expressed the desire to revise the existing labour legislation with the aim of improving the condition of workers employed at government-run and private enterprises.
  3. ↑ William II
  4. ↑ Frederick III
  5. ↑ As the new draft legislation against the Socialists was put to a vote in the Reichstag (see note 52), the deputies from the National Liberal Party voted against the additional clause providing for the banishment from Germany of 'undesirable persons' involved in the revolutionary movement.
  6. ↑ The Centre was a political party of German Catholics formed in June 1870. It expressed the separatist and anti-Prussian sentiments current in West and Southwest Germany. (The seats of its Reichstag deputies were in the centre of the hall, hence the name of the party.) The Centre's following consisted of socially disparate sections of Catholic clergy, landowners, bourgeois and peasants. Its deputies usually took a noncommittal attitude, manoeuvring between the pro-government parties and the Left opposition groups. Although it opposed the Bismarck government in the mid-1870s and early 1880s, the Centre voted for its measures against the working-class and socialist movement. Engels gave a detailed characterisation of the Centre in his work The Role of Force in History (see present edition, Vol. 26) and in his article 'What Now?' (see Vol. 27).
  7. ↑ The reference is to R. Puttkamer's election speech at Stolpe on 31 January 1890, against a repeal of the Anti-Socialist law (see note 52). In it he expressed the hope that the army and the Civil Service, loyal to the government, would be guarantors of order (Ordnung) in Germany. However Puttkamer did not rule out the government having to impose a major state of siege (instead of a 'minor' one). The minor state of 'siege' was envisaged by Clause 28 of the Anti-Socialist Law; the governments of German states, with the consent of the Federal Council, could impose a stage of siege for one year in certain districts and localities. In this case no meeting or assembly could take place without permission of the police; it was forbidden to circulate printed matter in public places; politically unreliable persons were to be deported from a given locality; the right to have or hold arms, their import and sale were prohibited or restricted.
  8. ↑ After his resignation from the post of War Minister, General Boulanger continued to whip up a revanchist campaign with the support of the chauvinist elements of different parties, from the radicals to the monarchists. On 8 July 1887, when Boulanger was leaving for Clermont-Ferrand to assume command of the 13th Corps, his supporters staged a chauvinist demonstration at the Lyons railway station. Boulangism was a reactionary movement in France in the mid-1880s, led by ex-War Minister General Boulanger. It urged a revanchist war against Germany to win back Alsace, annexed by Germany in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71. In alliance with the monarchists, the Boulangists sought to capitalise on the masses' discontent with the government's policy. Their large-scale demagogic propaganda was especially effective among the lower ranks of the army. France was under the threat of a monarchist coup. Measures taken by the republican government, with the support of the progressive forces led to the collapse of the Boulangist movement. Its leaders fled from France.
  9. ↑ The Possibilists (Broussists) were a reformist trend in the French socialist movement between the 1880s and the early 20th century. Its leaders - Paul Brousse and Benoit Malon -caused a split in the French Workers' Party (see note 33) in 1882 and formed the Federation of Socialist Workers. Its ideological basis was the theory of municipal socialism. The Possibilists pursued a 'policy of the possible' ('la politique des possibilites'). At the beginning of the 20th century the Possibilists merged with the French Socialist Party.